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ABSTRACT 
In the framework of work package 4 of the SafetyNet project, a European Commission 
supported research programme, the meaning of the concept of “independence”, its usefulness 
and applicability to road safety oriented accident investigation processes and their results was 
reflected upon. According to the project proposal, the work package was to draft good 
practice recommendations, applicable to all phases of data gathering and input, database 
management, data use and dissemination, with the aim of ensuring the quality of public 
European road accident data. It was to develop procedures for evaluating the “independence” 
of public European road accident databases and to draft recommendations for guaranteeing 
the “independence” of any future public European road accident database. During the first 
months of the project, the concept of independence was clearly defined. It applies to the 
investigation body. It has structural, financial and functional aspects. Some independent 
accident investigation bodies exist in aviation, maritime and rail transport sectors. For the 
investigation of road traffic accidents such independent bodies are rare. In the case of major 
road accidents, their investigation is usually conducted by multimodal accident investigation 
boards. In the case of more routine road accidents, there is no clear pattern in those countries, 
whose accident investigation practices were assessed. The status of the investigations and that 
of the persons conducting the investigations differs from one country to another.  
When it comes to actual investigation practices, the concept of independence was found to 
be insufficient or even inappropriate. Progressively it became obvious that the independence 
of the investigation body and that of the investigation process do not resolve the question of 
the quality of investigations nor that of the quality of any subsequent data. The quality of the 
investigation work relies certainly on the impartiality of the investigating body, permitted by 
its independence, but also on the qualifications and experience of the investigators, as well as 
the investigation methods used during the actual investigation processes. Data quality itself 
depends on what questions are to be answered and how adequate the available data is for 
answering. It is not the knowledge about independence of the investigating body, but the 
availability of information on all relevant aspects of data acquisition and management 
processes that allow its quality to be assessed. It is the concept of transparency that 
corresponds to these aspects of the accident investigation data production processes. 
Further consideration was given to the use of some key notions, such as “in-depth data” or 
“in-depth investigation”, which the road safety community generally takes for granted. Their 
relative fuzziness and their simultaneous use by professionals from different areas of expertise 
have caused misunderstandings in our discussions with experts who are not primarily oriented 
towards road safety. This has spurred an effort to clarify the vocabulary in use. 
This paper examines the work package 4 work with a slight sociological overtone. The 
work package 4 deliverables can be found at the European Road Safety Observatory web site 
at http://www.erso.eu/safetynet/content/wp_4_independent_accident_investigation.htm. 
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1 SAFETYNET WORK PACKAGE 4 
SafetyNet is an integrated project in the European Union 6th Framework Research 
Programme, running from May 2004 to April 2008. The aim of work package 4 of the 
SafetyNet project is to draft good practice recommendations, applicable to all phases of data 
gathering and input, database management, data use and dissemination. These 
recommendations are to ensure the quality of public European road accident data. The work 
package proposed to develop procedures for evaluating the “independence” of public 
European road accident databases and to draft recommendations for guaranteeing the 
“independence” of any future public European road accident database. 
As a first step, the meaning of the concept of independence was clarified. The following 
steps led to a path slightly different from what was foreseen. This paper takes the results of 
the work package 4 (SafetyNet, 2005, 2006, 2006b, 2007) as a starting point for a somewhat 
sociological approach to some of the issues the work package has dealt with so far. 
 
2 WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
All accidents1, and road accidents are no exception to the rule, can be investigated from three 
different perspectives. All are legitimate and reply to certain social demands. 
 
2.1 Three “pure” perspectives for accident investigation 
Firstly, under the rule of law, the judicial enquiry has a natural priority over other types of 
investigations. Accidents are investigated in order to determine whether the accident resulted 
from unlawful actions or otherwise involved illegal aspects, and whether somebody can be 
held responsible for what has happened. The outcome of the process then consists of 
punishing the guilty party and thus bringing relief to the victims. Typically, a judicial enquiry 
asks two types of questions: What happened? Who is responsible? (Cf. (a) in Figure 1.) 
Secondly, safety oriented investigations aim at understanding the general phenomenon of a 
road accident and ultimately to enhance safety of the categories of persons who are, in one 
way or another, involved in road accidents. These investigations do not seek to take a stand on 
guilt, but rather try to find causes and underlying contributing factors to the accident, and 
finally to make safety recommendations liable to suppress the danger or at least to diminish 
the existing risks. Typically, the purpose of safety investigations is to provide answers to two 
questions: What happened? Why did it happen? (Cf. (b) in Figure 1.) 
Thirdly, investigations that have their origin in human interest, propose to inform the 
public of all aspects of an accident judged relevant or interesting by the investigator. Rather 
than having one or two main questions to answer, such journalistic investigations typically 
give a global description, albeit not complete or thorough on all points, of what happened and 
when, who was involved, why and how did the accident happen. (Cf. (c) in Figure 1.) 
The “pure” types of investigation, identified so far, constitute very few problems. An 
accident that has no safety implications and no human interest aspects which would justify an 
investigation from those perspectives is naturally left to the judicial process. A basic, routine 
accident with no elements of illegality, hardly presents any aspects that would make it 
attention-grabbing from a human interest perspective. Finally a spectacular accident with no 
legal or safety implications would very quickly be abandoned to the exclusive curiosity of 
investigators for human interest purposes. 
                                                          
 
1 The discussion on what truly constitutes an accident and what does not—we can stop at a minimal definition of 
an accident as an “act of God”—is voluntarily left out of the scope of this paper. Should we embark in this 
direction, it would immediately become quite clear that some of the example-categories defined in the sub-
section 2.2 would most probably not qualify for “accidents”. However, this does not mean that they are not 
sometimes investigated as though they were true accidents, by the existing accident investigation boards.  
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However, accidents are rarely, if ever, interesting from only one perspective and it is at the 
edges, where two or all three perspectives meet, that things become complicated.  
 
2.2 Four “complex” types of accidents 
If we look at the edges, we can identify accidents that combine such characteristics that the 
necessary requirements for opening an investigation from two or all three perspectives are 
met. Let us now focus more precisely on the domain of transport accidents. 
On the border between legal perspective and safety perspective, one can find for instance 
fatal road accidents. Their investigation falls quite naturally within the mission of police 
forces. In some countries fatal road accidents are also investigated for safety reasons. It may 
well be that other types of road accidents, not necessarily fatal, are also investigated for safety 
reasons, because there is a national accident investigation scheme in force. A sample, or in 
some cases all accidents, of a certain type—for instance injury accidents, accidents involving 
certain types of road users or certain types of infrastructure etc.—are therefore investigated 
from both judicial and safety perspectives. (Cf. (d) in Figure 1.) 
 
 
Some accidents can be interesting both for human interest and for safety reasons. 
Accidents involving new technologies often qualify for this type. (Cf. (e) in Figure 1.) 
 
  
Accidents involving 
alcohol, speeding or 
other violations of law 
Accidents 
covered by 
media 
“Anonymous” 
accidents with no 
element of crime 
e. Accidents involving new 
technology safety features 
g. Major Accidents 
f. Accidents originating from 
intentional malicious conduct 
d. Fatal and/or sample 
accidents 
Figure 1: “Pure” and “complex” types of accident. 
(d), (e) and (f) are examples and do not pretend to cover all real or imaginable accident 
cases that fit these “complex” types of accident. The shaded areas are not intended to 
represent the number of accidents that occur or are investigated in each category. 
a. Judicial 
perspective 
c. Human 
interest 
perspective 
b. Safety 
perspective 
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The complex category at the intersection between legal and human interest perspectives 
undoubtedly contains (alongside accidents that result unintentionally from intended illegal 
behaviour) events that could be characterised as “accidents” only with some difficulty. As the 
focus of this paper falls outside this particular category of accidents, we shall not discuss the 
issue in further detail. (Cf. (f) in Figure 1.) 
The fourth category, which is interesting from all three perspectives, is that of major 
accidents. A major accident is an accident that has to be considered as particularly serious 
because of the number of killed or injured victims, or because of the extent of damage done to 
the environment or property. (Cf. (g) in Figure 1.) 
Figure 1 above summarises the 3 “pure” perspectives for accident investigation and the 4 
“complex” categories of accidents for which the investigation motives come from two or three 
different perspectives. 
It is in the “pure” safety perspective and at the edges of transport accident investigation 
from a safety perspective that our attention shall lay from this point on. 
 
2.3 Where does the specificity of safety oriented accident investigations lay? 
Following the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) definition, SafetyNet 
(2006b) characterises an “in-depth investigation” as an “accident investigation conducted by 
an investigator with specialized knowledge”. This definition has been the source of an intense 
debate among the work package partners. There seems to be some slack in it, which allows 
considering that even a standard police investigation into a road accident qualifies as an in-
depth accident investigation1. 
This is of course a major difficulty for anyone working in road accident investigation and 
who is used to characterising what they do in terms of in-depth road accident investigation. At 
the very least one must then add that it is for safety reasons that one is in the field of road 
accident investigation. Safety oriented accident investigations are usually conducted by 
investigation teams, which are composed of experts from several fields of knowledge. ISO 
defines such investigations as “multidisciplinary”. 
We can therefore say that we are interested in multidisciplinary, safety oriented road 
accident investigation. One can clearly see, however, that there is a variety of approaches 
inside this category of multidisciplinary, safety oriented accident investigation practices. This 
variety comes quite directly from the interaction of various perspectives for a particular 
accident and from the heterogeneous investigation motives that coexist inside the “pure” 
safety perspective. 
 
2.4 Structure of the paper 
It is probably in major accident investigations that these heterogeneous motives can be 
identified most clearly. In any case, it is with regard to those investigations that the question 
of “independence” was first formulated in a relatively clear manner. Also, we will start by 
looking at major accident investigations. This will allow us to define what independence 
means in the context of accident investigation for safety purposes. We will then move on to 
what could be called routine accident investigation and, subsequently, define the concept of 
transparency. Next, we will turn our regard towards accident investigation practices that fall 
between major and routine accident investigations in an attempt to determine whether it is 
independence or transparency that this middle category of accident investigations need 
most—or even a mixture of the two. Finally we will formulate some further critique towards 
the everyday use of the term “in-depth”, pointing out a further source of confusion. 
                                                          
 
1 Determining the conditions under which a journalistic investigation would qualify as an in-depth investigation 
is of course left to the specialists of that field. 
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3 MAJOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AND INDEPENDENCE 
Major accident investigations are conducted in order to determine accident causes and 
contributing factors. What makes these accident investigation practices particular is the 
conjunction of high levels of interest from all perspectives in the results of one single accident 
investigation. Nerb, Spada and Lay (2001) point out that the entertainment value of an 
accident depends on the importance of its consequences in terms of human, environmental or 
material loss. From a safety point of view, major accidents must be investigated because such 
investigations are essential for establishing a relationship based on trust between the public 
and the entire transport system (Giddens, 1990). Aviation, maritime, rail or pipeline transport 
accidents automatically qualify as major accidents. In road transport coach accidents or 
accidents involving the transport of dangerous materials, for instance, are treated as major 
accidents in many countries. 
While manufacturing and transport industries have a clear interest in making transport 
safer in a general manner, there are sometimes direct commercial interests at stake in some 
specific accident cases (Sarsfield, Stanley, Lebow, Ettedgui and Henning, 2000). In major 
accidents all sorts of conflicting interests could well try to influence the results of an 
investigation. Two obvious sources of influence can be identified. The first is the regulating 
authority or authorities and the second is the financially interested parties1.  
 
3.1 Structural independence  
In the first case the investigating body must be separate from the regulatory body or bodies. If 
it was not separate, this would put it in a position where it must investigate an accident that 
might have been caused or made worse by incomplete or faulty regulation, for which it would 
itself be responsible. Let us call this separation structural independence.  
Structural independence means that the body in charge of the investigation must not have 
regulatory tasks and that it must be permanent. Indeed, if it was not permanent there would be 
no memory of past events. Each accident, however similar to a preceding one, would be a 
totally new. The safety recommendations that would be formulated after an accident 
investigation, by an ad hoc committee, could easily be ignored and forgotten as there would 
be no one with the task to ensure that the recommendations have a real impact. 
Then, the investigating body needs investigators. These investigators must have a clearly 
defined status. Their rights must be stated by the law. 
Finally, the accident investigation must be separate from any judicial enquiry. There can 
and should be some cooperation, because an accident is always undividable. However, this 
cooperation must take place in a framework that recognises that the aim of the accident 
investigation for safety purposes is not to establish liabilities; it is to establish causes. 
 
3.2 Financial independence  
In the second case the investigating body must be separate from any financially interested 
parties. The investigating body must have an autonomous and preferably as stable as possible 
budget for functioning and carrying out its investigations. It must not depend on external 
financing for any particular investigation—whatever the source of such financing might be. 
In general it must not have financial or other relationships, with any commercial or similar 
vested interests. These requirements apply, of course, also to the investigators.  
 
                                                          
 
1 This remark, directly applicable to major accidents investigations, can be extended to all accident investigations 
from safety perspective. It may well be that while the investigation activities are in general conducted for safety 
purposes, in some specific accident cases commercial interests interfere with the safety motives.  
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3.3 Functional independence  
Finally we can identify a third aspect of independence, which we shall call the “functional 
independence”. In addition to its independence in terms of structures and finances, the 
investigating body must be able to accomplish the mission it serves in transport safety.  
The investigation body must have a legal obligation to investigate accidents of a certain 
severity—major accidents—and the liberty to investigate any other accident or series of 
accidents or incidents, whose investigation could result in the formulation of safety 
recommendations. 
The investigators in charge of an accident investigation determine themselves the scope 
and the methods of investigation. They must have access to all the necessary data—including 
the evidence for a judicial enquiry. They must also be able to interview/speak with the 
witnesses. 
There must be a possibility for other, foreign investigation bodies to participate, assist or 
observe the investigation.  
Finally the conclusions and the investigation report must be public and not subject to any 
external scrutiny before they are published. 
 
3.4 Where can such independent accident investigation bodies be found? 
Accident investigation bodies not submitted to outside control within the framework of their 
missions are most frequent in civil aviation. There are also some independent accident 
investigation bodies in maritime and rail transport, but none (at least to our best knowledge) 
in road transport. 
In Europe, there is a legal framework for the investigation of aviation, maritime and rail 
transport accidents. The European Directives that regulate independent accident investigations 
in those sectors have been progressively drafted since the beginning of the 1990s. The 
National legislations, implementing the European framework, have been or are in the process 
of being acted. The European framework leaves open the question of the actual organisation 
of the investigation activities. Some countries like Germany, France, Italy and the UK have 
opted for separate investigation bodies for most transport modes. Some others, The 
Netherlands, Finland and Sweden for instance have opted for a single multi-modal 
investigation board. 
Outside Europe, and without any claim of exhaustiveness, uni- or multimodal investigation 
boards exist for instance in Canada, Japan, Taiwan and in the USA. 
 
4 ROUTINE ROAD ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AND 
TRANSPARENCY 
With the exception of major road accidents, the independent accident investigation boards 
usually do not investigate road traffic accidents. This can easily be understood, suffice to take 
a look at the sheer numbers of annual road accidents and compare them with the numbers of 
accidents in the other transport modes. Table 1 illustrates the gap between the annual number 
of road fatalities on one hand and that of the other transport modes on the other.  
Transport mode Road Rail Air
Fatalities (EU-15) 32 637 75 *
Fatalities (EU-25) 43 472 105 6
Source: European Commission, 2006.
* Figure not available.
Figures for maritime transport are not available for EU-15/25. 
Table 1: Road, rail and air transport accident fatalities in EU in 2004. 
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4.1 The source of routine accident data 
The investigation of routine road accidents is a mission that comes within the remit of police 
forces. This is true not only for the potential judicial aspects of the accident, but also for the 
safety aspects. When the task of investigating accidents for judicial inquiries and for safety 
purposes is within the same body, it is not realistic to expect that both approaches are used 
simultaneously and that both investigations are always conducted as far as possible. If there 
was no element of crime in a road accident, would the police still investigate in order to 
determine all the contributing factors whatever these might be, perhaps road layout, road 
surface, fatigue caused by working conditions, and so forth? 
For the reason shown above—the number of road accidents and road fatalities—the idea of 
establishing an independent road accident investigation body, whose mission, according to the 
requirement of functional independence, would be to investigate all fatal road accidents and 
who could investigate any other accident or series of accidents or incidents, is unrealistic. 
 
4.2 The concept of transparency 
Routine road accident data comes from police forces, which is sometimes problematic but, on 
the other hand, establishing an independent road accident investigation body is not feasible. It 
is clear that the two different missions that police forces have, can at times be conflicting. In 
those cases, it is the safety investigation that will be put aside and the judicial investigation 
will have the priority. While one can then point out the regular shortages in terms of 
incomplete or missing data of the resulting police reports, we must immediately acknowledge 
the advantage, for road safety purposes, of having data available that is as close to exhaustive 
as feasible. 
Is there something else, then, that can be done to enhance the routine accident investigation 
processes and the subsequent data? More and better training associated with an adequate 
initial qualification, guidelines that set out how and what to look at, clearly established 
practices… All this, to be sure, and even more can be done in order to enhance the quality of 
routine road safety investigations and investigation data. However, before we start thinking 
about ways to enhance anything, we must already be able to assess the existing quality.  
This is where the concept of transparency becomes significant. Let us define transparency 
as the availability of such relevant information on the accident investigation and its results, 
which allow its quality to be assessed. Transparent accident investigation data is first-order 
data that is accompanied by second-order data on the conditions under which the accident 
investigation data was generated, allowing a quality assessment to be made. The second-order 
data covers all aspects from the conditions under which investigations are carried out to the 
characteristics of data management processes. A quality assessment of investigation data is 
possible if information is available on what the investigating entity does and how the entity 
does it. In other words, transparency means that anyone who wishes to evaluate the quality of 
a data can access the necessary information for doing that. 
 
5 SAFETY ORIENTED ROAD ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS 
We have now dealt with the two extremes of road accident types: major accidents and routine 
accidents. Any major accident and any subsequent investigation results might have 
devastating consequences to the transporting company, the manufacturer or the regulator. 
Therefore the investigating body must be independent of any vested interests, so that it can be 
impartial in its investigation. At routine accident level the harmful consequences to the above-
mentioned interests are limited. The consistency of the data collected on a multitude of 
everyday accidents determines the quality of the available statistical data. The important issue 
in this case is not the independence of investigating body; it is the transparency of the data, 
which allows a quality assessment to be made.  
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In short, we have seen that “independence” is essential for major accident investigations 
and that “transparency” is a more adequate requirement for routine accident investigations. Of 
course, road accident investigations are not limited to these two extremes; the bulk of safety 
oriented road accident investigating is done in the middle zone between the two, where a 
sample of road accidents is investigated. For ease of discussion this type of in-depth or 
multidisciplinary investigation will be referred to as safety oriented investigation hereafter. 
 
5.1 Do safety oriented investigations need independence or transparency? 
The above considerations on major and routine accident investigation give us some indication 
on what kind of configuration would be suitable for safety oriented investigations.  
Major accident investigations always result in a single accident report while routine 
accident investigation data is available and used in the form of macroscopical statistical data. 
Data resulting from safety oriented accident investigation has a similar statistical structure. Its 
reliability therefore lays heavily on transparency. The fact that there is, in practice, nothing or 
very little at stake, when it comes to the results of any single road accident investigation 
process whose aim is to feed data to a database, takes away a lot, if not all, of the pressure 
that in case of a single accident investigation exerts on the investigating entity. The need for 
independence is therefore lesser than in a major accident investigation. 
It could then seem that independence is very important to major accident investigation and 
has only a little importance for safety oriented road accident investigation. However, if this 
was the case, then accident investigators others than police investigators or judicial experts 
would have no legal status and no particular rights—starting with the right to access the 
accident scene—guaranteeing that they can accomplish their work. This would of course 
seriously undermine the quality of accident investigation data they produce. Also, the issue of 
conflicting regulatory, commercial or other interests, not on the single accident level but on 
database level, remains unresolved. 
It is then probably safe to say that independence is not as crucial for safety oriented 
accident investigation as it is for major accident investigations, but that there still are issues 
that make at least some aspects of independence of the investigating body quite important. On 
the other hand, the transparency of safety oriented accident investigation emerges as a “non 
negotiable” characteristic.  
 
 
Major 
accidents 
 
 
Single case 
investigation 
thousands of 
variables 
Need for Independence 
Representative 
sample of fatal 
accidents 
 
SafetyNet WP5.1  
132 variables 
Sample of 
accidents  
 
 
SafetyNet WP5.2 
500 variables 
Pendant  
400+ variables 
Need for Transparency 
Investigated 
accidents  
 
 
Level of 
detail of the 
resulting 
data 
 
 
Police reported 
accidents 
 
 
National base 
level safety 
statistics 
>100 variables 
Figure 2: Variety of road accident investigation schemes and their need for 
Independence or Transparency 
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We have established that safety oriented accident investigation needs first and foremost 
transparency and to a lesser extent some independence. What we have not established, is 
whether there is a need for the data resulting from such investigations. A thorough 
argumentation would of course be too long to develop, and would go far beyond the scope of 
this paper. However a brief clarification is necessary for what will follow. 
In the road transport sector, efficient action plans cannot be based on single accident 
investigations. What is needed then is analytical power offered by statistical data. On the 
other hand, basic level data often comes short of what would be needed in terms of data 
variables for more complex analysis, for example accident or injury causation. 
The intermediate level accident databases are the result of primarily safety oriented, 
multidisciplinary accident investigations. These investigations differ from major, single 
accident investigation in that they are always conducted with the aim to feed individual 
accident data into a database. The data is structured and managed so that the end product of an 
investigation is not an accident report, but statistical data. Such investigations are usually not 
conducted by the police forces or by any existing independent accident investigation body. 
 
5.2 Examples of actual safety oriented accident investigation 
On a pan-European scale there are only a few databases that result from safety oriented 
accident investigations. Some European projects, co-financed by the EU Commission, have 
developed such databases. For instance, the Pendant project developed an injury causation 
database with over 400 data variables. The SafetyNet project is currently developing two 
databases; one with 132 general data variables and the second on accident causation with 
some 500 data variables. The partnership for these three European databases comprises of 
universities, public research bodies or other bodies with a mission to advance road safety. 
In the USA, safety oriented investigations are conducted by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) which has also a regulatory mission. In Northern Europe, 
there are some national road accident investigation schemes that are worthy of mentioning. 
The Swedish Road Administration investigates all fatal accidents, but like NHTSA it is not 
fully independent in the sense that we have defined previously. 
The Finnish fatal accident investigation scheme probably comes closest to independence. 
The Finnish system comprises a Road Accident investigation Delegation (RAID), which is a 
supervising body with representatives from different Ministries, Administrations and the 
Finnish Motor Insurers Centre. Other bodies, such as Universities, the Finnish Accident 
Investigation Board and Highway Police may also be represented in RAID. RAID appoints 
the 21 Road Accident Investigation Teams (RAIT) whose investigation areas cover the whole 
of Finland. Actual road accident investigation work is organised by the Traffic Safety 
Committee of Insurance Companies (VALT). The system is financed from the motor vehicle 
insurance premiums. 
 
5.3 Databases with a lot of accidents vs. databases with a lot of variables  
If we now look again at Figure 2, we can see that there is a level missing in it.  
This missing level is between intermediate and detailed level databases—such as those that 
are being developed in SafetyNet work package 5—and the single case accident 
investigations. This level also utilises statistical data. In order to distinguish this level from 
intermediate and detailed level databases (which levels constitute the original focus for the 
SafetyNet work package 4), it is often called “in-depth” level. Let us summarise the 
characteristics of accident investigation data on each of the previously identified levels, before 
we go any further. 
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In Europe, police investigations feed into the national statistics and then to the Community 
database on Accidents on the Roads in Europe (CARE). The CARE database has a number of 
data variables limited to 38. CARE data can be considered as basic level information for road 
safety purposes and it serves well in road safety issue diagnosis. Intermediate and detailed 
level accident databases result from safety oriented, multidisciplinary accident investigations. 
These investigations are not single accident investigations and do not result in single accident 
reports. They feed individual accident data into a database. The data is structured and 
managed in order to exploit statistical data. The number of variables varies from a hundred to 
several hundred. Major accident investigations always result in an accident report containing a 
very large quantity of details on a single accident. 
The “in-depth” level undoubtedly makes use of statistics and it is, in most ways, quite 
similar to intermediate or detailed level. What has been said, for those levels, about the need 
for transparency, holds for “in-depth” level too. However, given the small number of cases the 
need for independence becomes more important. 
Like in Figure 3, it is easy to range these different levels of databases on two opposite 
scales going from high number of accidents, small quantity of details and limited costs of 
investigation to small number of accidents, high quantity of details and high costs.  
This classification is common and does not constitute any problem in itself—regardless of 
where precisely, in terms of quantity of details, the limits between intermediate, detailed or 
“in-depth” databases are drawn. It is the wide use of the terms “in-depth data” or “in-depth 
databases” that creates a problem. The intermediate and detailed level accident databases that 
SafetyNet work package 5 is developing are based on safety oriented, multidisciplinary in-
depth accident investigations. In that sense these databases are “in-depth” and the data in them 
is also “in-depth”. 
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variables) 
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(500 variables) 
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injury…) 
Figure 3: Number of investigated accidents, number of variables and cost of investigation 
*German In-Depth Accident Study 
** On-The-Spot accident research in United Kingdom 
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5.4 What do the notions of “in-depth data” and “in-depth database” mean? 
There is a source of possible confusion here. We have already seen that “in-depth 
investigation” is a concept defined by ISO and it applies to accident investigation practice. An 
in-depth accident investigation is conducted by an investigator with some sort of specialised 
knowledge. “In-depth database”, however, is completely different thing. “In-depth” in this 
context does not apply to any qualifications, knowledge or skills of the investigators, but to 
the quantity of data variables available on an accident in the end product of a process that 
begins with accident investigations; a database. We had previously realised that “an in-depth 
accident investigation” is not necessarily safety oriented. We must now acknowledge that “a 
safety oriented multidisciplinary accident investigation” does not necessarily produce what is 
perhaps improperly called “in-depth data”, which most probably means, when it is used 
conversationally, highly or very highly detailed data. 
For the sake of consistency it should then be agreed that “in-depth data” simply means data 
resulting from “in-depth accident investigation” and some other formulation needs to be 
found for speaking about the characteristics of the end product. The simplest solution could 
well be the use of “highly detailed data” and “highly detailed level database” when referring 
to data and databases that have a higher quantity of details on a smaller number of accidents. 
 
6 DEVELOPING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRANSPARENT AND 
INDEPENDENT ROAD ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
SafetyNet work package 4 is currently drafting recommendations for transparent and 
independent accident investigation of road accidents. The SafetyNet Deliverable 4.3 Draft 
Recommendations for Transparent and Independent Accident Investigation—A Working 
Paper (SafetyNet, 2006b) was discussed with a wide audience in a workshop organised in 
Brussels, March 27th 2007. 
 
6.1 Draft Recommendations 
The draft recommendations are structured in four clusters. The first cluster comprises the 
institutional issues, relating to all our previous work on different aspects of independence of 
the investigating body—its independence in terms of structure, of financing and in terms of 
functioning—its autonomy over what to investigate and how to investigate; the different 
fields of expertise the investigating body mobilises. 
The second cluster is on operational issues, related to the actual investigation processes. 
How the accident scene investigations are organised, starting from the moment the accident is 
notified. When and how does the investigation team receive the information about the 
accident? How do they proceed on the accident scene? What is their legal status? What is the 
status of their investigation? 
The third cluster covers data issues that fall under two major headings: data protection and 
data management. What is the status of the data gathered with regard to the judicial enquiry? 
How should the data be managed so that it is available for safety purposes? 
Finally the fourth cluster includes reports, dissemination and countermeasures. While 
investigation activities clearly should be organised at national level, some wider European 
coordination should exist and stakeholders should be involved in the implementation of 
countermeasures at all relevant levels. 
 
6.2 Feedback from the workshop 
While important modifications will undoubtedly be brought to the draft recommendations, it 
is worthwhile to indicate that out of 38 draft recommendations 35 were approved by at least a 
majority of 2/3 of the attendees, the three remaining received the approval of 58% to 63% of 
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the attendees. Unsurprisingly, the issues that need the most rethinking are quite fundamental. 
The first concerns the status of the investigating body: what is the right level of independence 
for it? A second issue concerns data protection: can and should all safety data be shielded 
from judicial uses? Thirdly, privacy issues raised concern: it might not be possible or even 
desirable to store all data that are collected. Fourthly, the remit of the body was questioned: 
should the remit be limited to investigation or should the body also make safety 
recommendations which it would address to the appropriate stakeholders; should the body 
have a role to play in the design and implementation of countermeasures? 
As a result of the workshop, a decision was made to draft separate recommendations or 
sets of recommendations for the investigation of different types of accidents—routine 
accident investigation, major accident or special case investigation, and safety oriented, 
multidisciplinary investigation for a sample of accidents. The issues mentioned above could 
well receive several, differing responses depending precisely on the type of accident that is 
considered. 
The SafetyNet work package 4 deliverables and other relevant information can be found at 
the European Road Safety Observatory web site at 
http://www.erso.eu/safetynet/content/wp_4_independent_accident_investigation.htm. 
 
7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This paper draws on work performed collectively by the current and former partners of 
SafetyNet work package 4: Pierluigi Aloia (DITS), Charlotte Brace (VSRC), Lindsay Cant 
(INRETS), Ydo de Vries (TNO), Helen Fagerlind (CHALMERS), Gabriele Giustiniani 
(DITS), Boudewijn Hoogvelt (TNO), Michael Jänsch (MUH), Cees Klootwijk (TNO), 
Arantxa Lallana (DITS), Dimitri Margaritis (TNO), Andrew Morris (VSRC), Dietmar Otte 
(MUH), Marianne Page (VSRC), Kalle Parkkari (VALT), Luca Persia (DITS), Lucy Rackliff 
(VSRC), Steven Reed (VSRC) and Davide Usami (DITS). 
However, due to the specific perspective adopted in the paper, it does not necessarily 
reflect the opinion of all SafetyNet work package 4 partners. 
 
REFERENCES 
European Commission (2006). Energy and transport in figures 2006. Brussels. 
Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Polity Press. 
International Organization for Standardization, ISO 12353-1:2002 Road Vehicles - Traffic 
accident analyses, Part 1: Vocabulary 
Nerb, J., Spada H., and Lay, K. (2001). Environmental Risk in the media: Modeling the 
reactions of the audience. Research in social problems and public policy, Vol. 9, pp. 57-85. 
SafetyNet, 2005. Deliverable D4.1. Bibliographical Analysis.  
SafetyNet, 2006a. Deliverable D4.2. Database Transparency. 
SafetyNet, 2006b. Deliverable D4.3. Draft Recommendations for Transparent and 
Independent Accident Investigation—A Working Paper. 
SafetyNet, 2007. Deliverable D4.4. Workshop Report. 
Sarsfield, L., Stanley, W., Lebow, C., Ettedgui, E. and Henning, G. (2000). Safety in the 
Skies: Personnel and Parties in NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations - Master Volume. 
Rand Institute for Civil Justice, MR-1122/1-ICJ. 
